Memorandum: Honorable Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of Army
Subject: Preliminary Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
From: Charles Moskos


Introduction: This report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is based on field research conducted in Kuwait. Qatar and Iraq, 29 November to 7 December, 2003, the report is based on a variety of methods: field observations, casual conversations, in-depth interviews, and a survey of approximately 500 soldiers. This preliminary report is based on the field observations, conversations and interviews. Statistical data of the surveys is now being tabulated and will be ready in several weeks.

The basic findings are derived from troops who were deployed in Iraq, those en route for two weeks R&R in CONUS (or Germany), and those on short-term R&R in Qatar. In addition to general social and morale attitudes, a special focus of attention was on the role of the chaplaincy in OIF. At all times, the large majority of troops indicated an eagerness to talk with the researchers as well as complete the surveys.

Overview. The first and most important finding is that the active duty soldiers displayed a higher level of morale than was anticipated. In broad terms, the mission was seen as most demanding in the so-called Sunni triangle and Mosul, less so in the Kurdish north, and middling in the Shiite south. Soldiers of OIF, of course, had complaints, but the overall tone was one of performing an important, if not always appreciated at home, mission. The research trip was completed before the capture of Saddam Hussein which undoubtedly has been a great morale booster.

OIF soldiers achieve exceptional levels of performance under very demanding conditions. They bring great credit to themselves, their commanders, and their country. Their accomplishments are especially noteworthy inasmuch as OIF represents a most strenuous and dangerous mission. With such performance in evidence, I have no recommendation for major changes with regard to overall command policies affecting soldiers. Some specific recommendations pertaining to personnel issues will be covered in the conclusion of the report.

With regard to danger, that general attitude was more fatalistic than fearful. The mission goal was seen as ridding the country of the Saddam Hussein regime and bringing about a more stable and democratic Iraq. There was not much talk about weapons of mass destruction or terrorist linkages with 9/11 events, some illustrative quotes follow:

a. "Sure there lots of extremists, but the people like us generally. Especially the kids.

b. "Iraqis are like little children.”  “We may have to spank them so they will grow up to be good adults.”

c. "People back home don’t get the big picture, There are good things as well bad things happening here.”

Reservists, in contrast to the generally good morale of the active-duty soldiers, that of the reserve components - again in general terms was markedly lower. The term Reservists is used here to include both Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers. The complaint that reservists were "second class citizens" in OIF was frequently heard, or as one put it, on a scale of one to ten, was a 12. . Issues raised by reservists include the following:

1. Reservists frequently serve longer in theater than do active duty soldiers and are less likely to know the end date of their OIF deployment.

2. Stop-loss affects reservists more than active-duty soldiers.

3. Promotions for reservists often get stalled because their home unit cannot promote them while they are activated for OIF and they cannot be promoted in OIF because they are reservists.

4. Advanced schooling that would be available if they were still in their home unit is delayed and not likely to be properly available when they return to their home unit.

5. KBR guards received three times more compensation for the same guard duty as do reservists. Civilian contractors often had better BDUs and boots than reservists.

6. Career reservists should be allowed to acquire retirement pay earlier, even if prorated lower.

It should be noted that the above morale description of reservists contrasts with the generally higher morale - compared to active-duty soldiers of reservists in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo

The Chaplaincy. The current mission of OIF is one that has yet to be conceptualized properly in Army thought. It has elements of combat, guerilla war, asymmetrical war, liberation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and occupation, constabulary, to name a few. With such an ambiguous mission, the role of the chaplaincy becomes more central than ever.

1. In combat operations, the chaplains' role is typically seen more, conventional religious, even denominational, terms. In OIF, the chaplains’ role is seen more in spiritual and counseling terms.

2. The chaplain, even if a stranger, is regarded as one who gives honest advice without any hidden agenda.

3. From a soldier s viewpoint, seeing a chaplain about a personal problem carries much less stigma than seeing a mental health counselor. As one soldier put it, seeing a mental health counselor means you’re a nut job in the file.

4. Chaplains need to make special efforts to circulate among the troops rather than be constrained by administrative jobs in headquarters areas.

General Observations.

1. The local Iraqis are referred to as hajjis (also spelled hadjis), it seems to have no special negative meaning. This contrasts with "rag heads' used to describe locals in the first Gulf War or with gooks and slopes of the Vietnam era. (Hajji, of course, originally derives from those who have made pilgrimages to Mecca,) One theory is that the G.I. term originated from a character in the cartoon television show Johnny Quest.

2. E-mail is widely used by troops in OIF. Thus, regular communication with home is the rule rather than the exception.

3. A new technological innovation is the use of DVDs with a laptop computer to watch current movies in the field.

4. The absence of a good field manual on Iraq was noted by many. Soldiers also report that the prep program for OIF seemed to portray an Iraq that was more fundamentalist Islamic than the more secular society they actually encountered. Likewise for Kuwait and Qatar.

5. The two week R&R in CONUS is widely appreciated. The shorter usually four days R&R tours in Qatar are also welcome respites. A common complaint in Qatar, however, is that individuals are not routinely assigned to take R&R troops into town, without who they must remain on base.

6. There is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that some units are overmanned and doing little, while others are undermanned and over stretched.

7. Race relations problems appear minimal. There was some undercurrent among black troops that Jessica Lynch was the object of overplayed propaganda compared to the similar experiences of Shoshana Johnson.

8. It may seem far fetched, but an unobtrusive measure of morale could be a content analysis of the graffiti in the portable toilets.

Recommendations:

1. Consider a video/DVD along the lines of the famous "Why We, Fight movies directed by Frank Capra during WVVII. Themes to be developed could include serving a just cause, the evils of the Hussein regime, stepping into history, the new greatest generation, etc. OIF is a shaping experience that they will look back upon with pride for the rest of their lives.

2. Short-Term FAOs, The issue of Arab interpreters is central. Consider a short-term warrant-officer program for Arab-speaking soldiers and recruits as kind of temporary FAOs, civil affairs assistants, etc. Or reconstitute the old specialist ranks for linguistically qualified soldiers. This would apply to recruiting from current U.S. citizens/American residents. Such recruitment might focus on Arab students in American universities. Consideration might also be given to recruiting Arab speakers from other English-Speaking countries.

3. Have incoming NCOs and junior officers take a quick say 3 week - course on Arab culture and learn a few Arab expressions. This could be akin to the 3-week German course for Incoming company commanders in the USAREUR of old.

4. Military Police should be given a combat medal equivalent to the combat medal given to medics in hostile fire zones.

5. Iraq CAP. This would be along the lines of the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP) where rile squads joined local platoons in Vietnam. But in OIF offer the local recruited Iraqis extraordinary inducements, e. g. high pay, guaranteed pension, perhaps even American citizenship,

6. Consider allowing alcohol usage on a limited basis in Iraq. Limited official drinking as is now allowed in Qatar, would reduce illicit drinking.

7. Those activated from the IRR rather than a regular reserve unit are typically used as fillers. In these cases the families of the IRR activate do not have a local soldier support system. Some system should be developed where IRR families could come under the purview of the nearest military base.

8. Explore use of short-term active-duty enlistments to perform duties currently conducted by reservists. Ref. memo to Hon. L. Brownlee , 15-Month Enlistment Option, dated 14 Oct 2003.
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Subject: Preliminary Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by:

Charles Moskos
Department of Sociology
Northwestern University
1810 Chicago Avenue
Evanston, Illinois, 60208-1330